SONG CHEN/CHINA DAILY

Modern threats do not wait for governments to agree on how to respond together. Drug networks, cybercriminals, human trafficking and extremist groups move across borders faster than many institutions can act. States often move more slowly, especially when they have to cooperate. Especially when political trust is limited. This is why coordination, even without perfect agreement, has become one of the most valuable assets in international security.

As the Shanghai Cooperation Organization marks its 25th anniversary in 2026, its experience deserves attention beyond the usual discussion of counter-terrorism. The SCO was founded in Shanghai in June 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It has since expanded into a broader Eurasian organization with 10 member states, including India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus. Its growth has made the SCO both more diverse and more complex.

That complexity is precisely the point. The SCO's real strength is not that its members always see the world in the same way. They do not. They differ in size, geography, political traditions, economic interests and foreign policy priorities. The organization's importance lies in something more practical: it provides a framework in which states with different perspectives can still coordinate on problems that none of them can solve alone.

This is a useful lesson for a fragmented international environment. Too often, multilateralism is judged by whether it produces full political consensus. But in the real world, complete agreement is rare. Coordination is more attainable and often more urgent. When a drug route crosses several borders, when illegal financial flows pass through multiple jurisdictions, or when a cyberattack is launched from one country against victims in another, waiting for perfect political harmony is not a viable strategy.

The SCO began with a strong security focus, particularly with regard to terrorism, separatism and extremism. Over time, however, its agenda has widened. Countering drug trafficking, organized crime, illegal migration and cyber-related threats has become part of the broader understanding of regional security. This evolution reflects a simple reality: today's threats are interconnected. Drug trafficking may finance extremist activity. Illegal migration can be exploited by criminal intermediaries. Cybercrime can support fraud, recruitment, propaganda and money laundering. Security is no longer a set of separate files; it is a network of overlapping risks.

In this context, the SCO's value lies in routine. Regular meetings among officials, channels for information exchange, joint exercises, shared assessments and professional contacts may sound less dramatic than summit declarations. Yet they are the infrastructure of practical security. Trust rarely appears overnight. It is built through repetition, predictability and the knowledge that, when a problem emerges, there is someone across the border who can be contacted.

The anti-drug agenda is a good example. The SCO Anti-Drug Strategy for 2024-2029, adopted at the Astana summit in 2024, shows that the organization is trying to respond not only to traditional narcotics routes but also to new methods of distribution. The international anti-drug operation "Web" in 2025 targeted the use of internet resources and virtual payment systems in drug trafficking. This illustrates a wider trend: criminal networks are becoming digital. Law enforcement, in turn, must cooperate faster and be more coordinated and technologically capable.

The lesson is relevant not only for Eurasia. Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa all face their own combinations of migration pressure, border management challenges, criminal networks and digital vulnerabilities. The SCO model should not be copied mechanically by other regions. Institutions grow out of history, geography and political culture. But the SCO method — of keeping communication open, separating practical coordination from broader disagreements and focusing on shared risks even when political consensus is difficult — is worth studying.

This approach is especially important where security and humanitarian issues overlap. Migration, for example, should not be treated simply as a security threat. Many people move because of war, poverty, climate stress or the quest for safety. But criminal groups often exploit such movements, turning human vulnerability into profit. A responsible policy must therefore combine humanitarian principles with stronger coordination against smuggling networks, forged documents, illegal financing and digital recruitment. That balance cannot be achieved by one country acting alone.

At 25, the SCO's record is not a story of perfect unity. It is a story of managed diversity. Its members do not need to agree on everything in order to work together on what threatens them all. This may be the organization's most practical message to the wider world.

In an age of networked threats, coordination is not a technical detail. It is a strategic asset. Consensus is desirable, but coordination is indispensable.